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CONSENT CONFUSION
Aya Gruber †

The slogans are ubiquitous: “Only ‘Yes’ Means ‘Yes’”; “Got Consent?”;
“Consent is Hot, Assault is Not!” Clear consent is the rule, but the meaning of sexual
consent is far from clear. The current state of confusion is evident in the numerous
competing views about what constitutes mental agreement (grudging acceptance or
eager desire?) and what comprises performative consent (passive acquiescence or an
enthusiastic “yes”?). This paper seeks to clear up the consent confusion. It charts the
contours of the sexual consent framework, categorizes different definitions of
affirmative consent, and critically describes arguments for and against affirmative
consent. Today’s widespread uncertainty is partly a product of the affirmative
consent reform juggernaut and its rapid legal changes. Confusion is also connected to
the nature of consent as a liberal, contract principle. Sexual consent appears a
morally self-evident issue of free will, but it actually veils a struggle between various
judgments about how sex should happen, its benefits and harms, and the role of
criminal law in regulating it. Indeed, proponents and critics of affirmative consent
entertain different empirical and normative presumptions and often simply talk past
each other. Structurally mapping the consent framework and the affirmative consent
debate reveals exactly what is at stake in this new world of reform—a revelation
necessary for meaningful dialogue on acceptable sex and acceptable sex regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The slogans are ubiquitous: “Only ‘Yes’ Means ‘Yes’”; “Got
Consent?”; “Consent is Hot, Assault is Not”; “Ask First!”; and the
unsettling, “Just Because She’s Drunk Doesn’t Mean She’s DTF,” which
appeared on glossy posters at my law school. Clear consent is clearly the
rule. Forcible rape is totally passé, not in the sense that it does not occur,
but in the current legal conception of sexual assault’s essence. Rape law
scholars have begun to regard force as so archaic as to barely merit
mention. Far from the bad-old-days in which “real rape” was limited to
a narrow category of violent stranger assaults resisted by victims “to the
utmost,” 1 contemporary lawmakers, scholars, and university
administrators, applying the consent framework, view as rape behaviors
1 See People v. Geddes, 3 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Mich. 1942); Kinselle v. People, 227 P. 823, 825
(Colo. 1924).
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ranging from brutal to boorish to quite normal. 2 Today, the criminal
law has an interest whenever unconsensual sex occurred, regardless of
why it occurred.
However, consent is far from clear. The urgent question is “Got
Consent?,” but people have wildly different conceptions about when to
answer, “I do.” Consent is a liberal, contractarian principle that seems a
peculiar basis for the criminal regulation of sex. 3 The contractual
framework is both over- and under-inclusive. It could dictate that sexual
agreement procured through deception, tainted by intoxication, or
failing to meet formalities is invalid, leading to overbroad laws. 4 At the
same time, contract principles might permit defendants to procure
sexual consent through capitalizing on fear, insecurity, or lack of
bargaining power, so long as such behavior does not amount to the
duress that vitiates a contract. 5 As a result, “sexual consent” has a
meaning quite distinct from consent in contract law.
But what is this meaning? Some will say that sexual consent is
present when parties are mentally willing to have sex. However, there
are a variety of views about what constitutes a consensual mental state,
ranging from enthusiastic to grudging, from hedonistic to instrumental,
from sober to quite inebriated. 6 Others argue that focusing on internal
willingness puts victims on trial; thus, sexual consent should be about
what the parties say and do. 7 Even here, there is considerable variability
on what constitutes performative consent. Some hold that engaging in
sexual activity without protest, or with weak protest, communicates
consent. Others insist that consent be “affirmatively” or “positively”
expressed. 8 To complicate matters, affirmative consent, depending on
who you ask, runs the gamut from nonverbal foreplay to “an
enthusiastic yes.” 9
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing contemporary standards).
See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 700–04 (1990).
4 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy,
122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013) (asserting that the consent framework is inconsistent with legal
rejection of rape by deception); cf. Mark Kelman, Thinking About Sexual Consent, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 935, 978 (2005) (book review) (complicating purely autonomist notions of sexual
consent).
5 See Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171,
204 (2013) (positing a feminist and relational theory of contract).
6 See infra Section I.A.
7 See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) (moving to affirmative consent because
old law created credibility contest that put victim on trial); Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV.
763, 794–98 (1986) (noting that some analyze whether complainant consented by looking at
sexual history).
8 See infra Section II.F.
9 See infra Part II.
2
3
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Actual definitions of consent in criminal codes and university
manuals, with their vague references to “free agreement” and
“affirmative cooperation,” do little to simplify matters. 10 It is no wonder
that people come to wholly different conclusions about how consent
and affirmative consent standards actually impact legal decisions and
human behavior. Stephen Schulhofer, the reporter for the Model Penal
Code Sexual Assault Project to reform the much-maligned current MPC
rape provisions, 11 has defended affirmative consent as merely reflecting
the common sense norm that “it is unacceptable to take liberties with
someone’s person or property without permission.”12 Compare this with
Vox Media founder Ezra Klein’s passionate, but somewhat bizarre,
justification of California’s affirmative consent law on the ground of its
radically regulatory nature:
If the Yes Means Yes law is taken even remotely seriously it will settle
like a cold winter on college campuses, throwing everyday sexual
practice into doubt and creating a haze of fear and confusion over
what counts as consent. . . . [However,] for one in five women to
report an attempted or completed sexual assault means that everyday
sexual practices on college campuses need to be upended, and men
need to feel a cold spike of fear when they begin a sexual encounter. 13

What has caused so much confusion? In short, decades ago,
feminist reformers affected the shift from defining rape as forced sex to
defining it as unconsensual sex, in an effort to broaden liability for bad
10 For a thorough discussion of existing consent statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 58–61 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015)
[hereinafter MPC Draft 5]. The MPC Tentative Draft No. 1 (Apr. 30, 2014), is available at
http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02-Article_120/20140807/03_Proposed
Revision_MPC213_Excerpt_201405.pdf, but it is substantially different. A later version of the
Model Penal Code consent provisions was adopted by the ALI Council in January 2016 and
updated on January 17, 2016. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ARTICLE § 213 (AM. LAW INST.,
Selected Revisions: §§ 213.0(3) & 213.2 2016) [hereinafter MPC Revisions] (on file with
author). However, the ALI membership did not accept that version at the annual meeting, and
a new draft is in the works. See Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM.
LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses (last visited
Oct. 29, 2016). This article refers to Draft 5 throughout.
11 See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be
Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses, supra note 10.
12 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 U.
PAC. L. REV. 665, 681 (2016) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Consent]. Professor Schulhofer has been a
forceful proponent of affirmative consent, through words of actions, for years. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE
OF LAW 271 (1998) [hereinafter SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX].
13 Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” Is A Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It, VOX (Oct.
13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terriblebill-and-i-completely-support-it.

GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

CONSENT CONFUSION

12/14/2016 12:58 PM

419

sexual behavior. 14 However, even this shift proved unsatisfying to many
activists who contended that biased or mistaken decision-makers
misapplied the standard, leading to under-regulation of unwanted sex.
Activists urged affirmative consent standards to compel legal actors to
arrive at the “right” conclusion about what constitutes rape. However,
couching this revolutionary reform as a better way of doing consent
obscured the various presumptions and normative commitments
underlying reformers’ ideas about what is the right conclusion. To be
sure, “unconsensual sex” is often just a proxy for whatever one views as
harmful or unacceptable sexual behavior (i.e., intoxicated sex, subtly
coerced sex, insufficiently communicative sex, rough sex, etc.). Today,
affirmative consent reform is a juggernaut. The rapid proliferation of
law, policy, and scholarship defining sexual consent has produced a
legal terrain marked by uncertainty, contradiction, and hidden value
judgments.
This Article seeks to clear up the consent confusion. It is not the
first, nor will it be the last, word on consent in rape law. But it is the first
to categorize and clarify the many words uttered in the media, in
legislatures, and on campuses about the meaning of sexual consent. This
categorical enterprise has two primary goals. First, it offers a toolkit for
deciphering, deconstructing, and yes, dismantling affirmative consent. 15
It catalogues consent as a preface to a critical analysis of the arguments
for and against the affirmative consent standard. The paper makes sense
of an often muddled debate in which interlocutors entertain different
presumptions and proceed to simply talk past each other. Some, for
example, concentrate on whether sex without a yes is morally wrongful,
while others focus on whether requiring a yes will help prosecutors get
at “true” rapists who compel unwanted sex. 16 Debaters fluctuate
between formalist and legal realist assertions, empirical bases for the
rule and theoretical ones, and individualist frames and questions of just
social order. Structurally mapping the debate is an important step
toward a full understanding of the exact stakes of affirmative consent
reform. Accordingly, much of this Article is taxonomical in nature―it
charts consent, categorizes affirmative consent standards, and indexes
affirmative consent argument types.
The Article has a second, more iconoclastic, goal: demystification.
The consent framework’s unyielding and simplistic promotion of
14 Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587–603
(2009) [hereinafter Gruber, Rape, Feminism].
15 The analysis herein betrays my predisposition against affirmative consent as the
benchmark for criminal sex regulation. Nonetheless, I am quite sympathetic to the standard
and very far from many anti-affirmative consent polemicists. See id.
16 See infra Sections II.B, II.D.
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autonomy has obfuscated the empirical and moral bases of a complex
set of reforms. 17 As noted above, many reformers initially rationalized
affirmative consent as a way to control decision-makers’ tendency to
exonerate defendants, even in cases of clear unwillingness. 18 But that
attempt to manage sexist jurors’ inferences has created a world in which
law, popular discourse, and public health surveys define rape as sex
without affirmative consent, rather than compelled or unwilling sex.
Thus, the prohibition of a broad category of sex (sex without a yes)
somewhat surreptitiously evolved under the banner of preventing a
narrower, less controversial category (compelled or aversive sex).
Understanding the empirical and normative presumptions underlying
affirmative consent is a necessary step toward responsible management
of unlawful sexual behavior and the criminal apparatus constructed to
regulate it.
Part I of the Article describes unambiguously consensual sex as a
“consent transaction” between two (or more) people, involving both
mental states and external manifestations of those states. Part II explains
affirmative consent as an effort to narrow the world of external
manifestations. It also categorizes affirmative consent standards, from
very regulatory to more expansive. Part III maps the affirmative consent
debate, which includes clashes over how people actually negotiate sex,
whether sex without affirmative consent is culpable, and how
affirmative consent laws play out in practice. The conclusion suggests
that the rape discussion should shift from jousting over consent to truly
grappling with the limits of acceptable sex and acceptable sex regulation.

17 Cf. Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and
Criminal Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 47, 53 (1998) (“The idea of autonomy is one
which . . . assumes rather than explicates what is valuable about sexuality itself.”).
18 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.

GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

12/14/2016 12:58 PM

CONSENT CONFUSION

421

I. CONSENT
Consent is a philosophical, psychological, and legal quagmire, the
escape from which I do not attempt here. Nevertheless, it bears
mentioning that, philosophically, premising morality on consent
implicates complicated theories of free will and determinism. 19 As a
matter of psychology, harmful and regretted but “chosen” decisions can
be more discomfiting than unavoidable or coerced occurrences. Some
studies of rape and trauma, for example, link lasting psychological harm
to self-blame and feeling like one had some control over the assault. 20 In
terms of the law, critical legal theorists―feminists foremost among
them―have argued that the principle of consent legitimates unjust
hierarchies, economic inequality, and overt discrimination. 21 From
adhesion contracts to the Supreme Court’s approval of consent to a
suspicionless police search, scholars have long viewed consent’s
justificatory power with a jaundiced eye. 22
Feminists like Catharine MacKinnon assert that in a world rife
with male hierarchy, women rarely freely choose sex. 23 Given
feminism’s anti-liberalism bent, it is curious that consent evolved as the
enlightened construction of rape law. 24 The force and coercion
19 See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL (Robert Kane ed., 2002); cf. Peter
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (John
Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (intimating that the free will determinism debate is
a normative/legal, rather than metaphysical, debate).
20 See Sara E. Ullman et al., Psychosocial Correlates of PTSD Symptom Severity in Sexual
Assault Survivors, 20 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 821, 822 (2007) (correlating trauma with
“attributions of self-blame” and citing studies).
21 See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997,
999 (1985); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1199–1200 (1990); Joseph
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 975 (1983); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L.
REV. 1247, 1265 (1999); cf. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 395 (1984).
22 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; Morgan Cloud, Ignorance
and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1143 (2007) (discussing consent searches).
23 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence]. More recently, MacKinnon has remarked that “sex that is forced, coerced, and
pervasively unequal can be construed as consensual, wanted, and free.” Catharine A.
MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081,
1088 (2004); see also Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 130–32
(1992); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1442, 1458 (1993) [hereinafter West, Beyond Rape].
24 See Robin West, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 221 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). In the domestic violence
arena, feminist backlash to consent created a hyper-regulatory regime of mandatory arrest and
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standard―which actually entails considering the larger circumstances
of the sex―is a denigrated relic. 25 So what happened? From the 1970s to
the 1990s, rape reformers highlighted cases in which rape-permissive
courts, jurors, and law-makers narrowly defined force to prohibit
violently compelled sex but permit a wide variety of otherwise coerced
sex (i.e., subtle intimidation, “pinning,” or capitalizing on scary
circumstances). 26 Thus, advocates sought to broaden the category of
sexual incidents subject to criminal regulation. 27 Some jurisdictions did
this by expanding force to include more situations, for example,
“emotional” or “moral” coercion. 28 Other jurisdictions broadened
regulation by defining rape as sex without consent, rendering the
defendant’s coercive behavior (or lack thereof) mere circumstantial
evidence of consent or irrelevant. 29 The move to consent proved
prosecution, concerning liberal critics about victims’ autonomy. See Leigh Goodmark,
Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic
Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
25 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 466
(2016) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent]; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on and Off
Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2015) (calling force “archaic”); Lani Anne Remick, comment, Read
Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1116
(1993); cf. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1977) (noting that non-consent is the “ancient” definition of rape but that
“‘force’ came to be added”).
26 Two Pennsylvania cases figure prominently in that critique. See Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per curiam) (holding no “forcible
compulsion” when complainant repeatedly said “no”), aff’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that adult
guardian’s threat to return fourteen-year-old to juvenile detention was not “forcible rape”),
aff’d, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988); see also Berger, supra note 25, at 8; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
YALE L.J. 1087, 1093 (1986) (“If in 1986 silence does not negate consent, at least crying and
saying ‘no’ should.”); Cheryl Siskin, Criminal Law―No. The “Resistance Not Required” Statute
and “Rape Shield Law” May Not Be Enough―Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (per curiam), alloc. granted, 613 A.2d 556 (PA. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REV. 531, 560
(1993). But see J.H., No. 6-2801-9874-2, 1995 WL 937281, at *5, 8 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs.
Oct. 16, 1995) (finding respondent violated student conduct code prohibiting “implied use or
threatened use of force” because “[h]e didn’t ask, and she didn’t say”).
27 See Kit Kinports, Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755,
755–56 (2001) (describing the under-inclusion argument).
28 See, e.g., State v. Eskridge, 526 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ohio 1988) (“[F]orce . . . can be subtle
and psychological.”); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (rape may
involve “moral, psychological or intellectual force”). Many feminists prefer the move toward
broad coercion, rather than liberal consent. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and
the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988).
29 The consent move was spurred on by varied analogic reasoning, such as describing rape
as a battery—“any ‘unauthorized [sexual] touching.’” In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J.
1992). But the battery analogy proves complicated given that for every-day
touchings―handshakes, back pats, etc.―the law is honored in the breach. Of course, sexual
intercourse is not a hand shake, nor is it a fistfight. Other consent analogies fare little better (sex
is materially different from surgery, force-feeding, taking property, etc.). Some feminists have
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enduring, and today the nature of rape as a “harm to autonomy” is
rarely up for debate. 30
Debated more frequently is the question of what sexual consent is.
Consensual sex is described variously as desired, wanted, willing, or
agreed-to sex. 31 While such terms are used interchangeably, they can
mean quite different things. People could willingly have unwanted sex,
or they could want but not desire sex. 32 For the moment, let me put
aside any further parsing of these distinctions. For now, I, like most rape
commentators, will treat the consent terms fungibly. The more pressing
definitional question is whether sexual consent is a mental state, an
external performance, or both.
There is little controversy when the sexual actors’ performances
correspond to their internal states. For example, if a person really did
not want sex and candidly expressed that lack of desire, there will be
little question that the sex was not “consensual.” 33 Controversy arises,
however, when there is mismatch between the internal state and
external manifestations. Affirmative consent critics recoil at the idea
that it can be rape when the complainant passionately desired—and the
defendant believed they 34 passionately desired—sex simply because the
consent performance was deficient. 35 Likewise, feminists are apt to
lauded liberal autonomy’s instrumental value to women. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, From
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805
(1999).
30 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 328 P.3d 77, 89 (Alaska 2014) (“[R]ape has as its goal
preventing the loss of autonomy, dignity, free will, and bodily integrity . . . .”); People v. Soto,
245 P.3d 410, 418 (Cal. 2011) (rape is violation of “sexual autonomy”); Estrich, supra note 26, at
1095 (“[A]ny discussion of rape begins (and ends) with consent.”); R. George Wright,
Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1397, 1406 (1995) (equating “underemphasis of women’s consent” with “insufficient respect for
the dignity of women”).
31 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 671 (calling consensual sex “mutually
desired”).
32 Sexual “desire” seems to connote the particular intent to have sex for physical
satisfaction. “Wanted” sex, by contrast, could mean sex that one hopes will happen for any
reason. “Willingness” might imply a neutral state of mind, that is, the person can take the sex or
leave it. “Agreeing” to sex might have a different meaning, involving some “meeting of the
minds,” where a person agrees to an offer of sex.
33 Of course, defendants may have the option to argue lack of mens rea if their warped view
of sexual communication led them to honestly believe the other consented. See infra notes 55–
59 and accompanying text.
34 I try not to specify the sex/gender of parties unless specific to a point or case.
Occasionally, I will use “their” or “they” as a singular pronoun to signify an individual without
sex/gender. See Jessica Bennett, She? Ze? They? What’s In a Gender Pronoun, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/fashion/pronoun-confusion-sexual-fluidity
.html?_r=0.
35 See Sarah Gill, Essay, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using Education to
Prevent Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 61 (1996) (discussing this argument); infra notes
165–68 and accompanying text.
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dismiss as coerced an expressed “yes” that did not reflect internal
willingness. 36 Consequently, uncontroversial consent to sex entails what
I call a “consent transaction,” involving both a sufficient internal mental
state and external performance of that state.
A sexual consent transaction between two people, A and B, consists
of a three-step process. Step 1: A internally agrees to have sex. Step 2: A
displays external manifestations of that agreement. Step 3: Based on A’s
external manifestations and the context, B believes A internally agrees to
have sex. Of course, B must also share A’s attitude toward the sex, and A
must believe B internally agrees. For now, B will represent the sex
proponent (the person seeking sex) and A will be the sex
acceptor/rejecter. Here is an illustration of the consent transaction:

Figure 1: The Consent Transaction
Let us discuss each step in turn, beginning with A’s mental state. 37

36 Some activists go even further arguing that any time a person does not internally want
sex it is sexual assault, even if the person says “yes,” and there is no coercion. See, e.g., Wendy
Murphy, Opinion, Title IX Protects Women. Affirmative Consent Doesn’t, WASH. POST (Oct. 15,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/10/15/title-ix-protectswomen-affirmative-consent-doesn't/?utm_term=.97e664743d5b;
cf.
CATHARINE
A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 82 (1987) (articulating a
“political” definition of rape as “whenever a woman has sex and feels violated”).
37 When examining Figure 1, A may start to look distinctly feminine and B masculine. See
Lacey, supra note 17, at 60 (critiquing the consent framework for establishing a gendered
asymmetric relationship between sexual participants).
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Step 1: A’s Internal Agreement to Sex

A consensual mental state involves a “free” decision to have sex.
The meaning of free is subject to interpretation. As noted above, some
feminists assert that because of gendered pressures and gross inequality,
coercion is the default for women. 38 However, proponents of consent,
even affirmative consent, do not characterize women’s agreement to sex
as mostly illusory, but rather hold that only specific coercive pressures
render consent ineffective. 39 For example, the September 2015 Draft of
MPC sexual assault revisions provide that consent does not count when
it is “the product of force, restraint, threat, coercion, or exploitation.”40
Yet the issue of which types of “coercion” or “exploitation” (i.e., lies,
promises, relationship, or economic factors) undermine consent is a
subject of intense controversy among rape experts. 41 Thus, the consent
framework has not relieved policymakers of the need to discuss with
specificity the types of pressures that render sex criminal, despite
apparent agreement. 42
In addition, there are controversies over which mental states are in
fact consensual. Figure 1 draws the line at grudging acquiescence,
counting it as consensual, but designating being unsure as insufficient.
By contrast, some commentators suggest that consent requires sex to be
enthusiastic, deliberative, hotly desired, and/or engaged in for its own
sake. 43 Anything else, they argue, should be regulated (whether through
criminal law, disciplinary proceedings, or public health programs). 44 Of
course, epistemic states are indefinite, and the forms they can take are
infinite. Consequently, just as drawing lines between culpable mental
states (knowing, reckless, negligent) involves external normative
judgments, so does dictating the specific quality of internal consent.
The requirement of internally consensual sex, which may appear
See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 2151, 2177 (1995).
40 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 32.
41 See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39
(1998) (fraud and coercion); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1405–11.
42 See West, Beyond Rape, supra note 23, at 1442.
43 See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. REV. 881, 925–28
(2016) (cataloguing various colleges’ and universities’ sexual assault definitions that define
consent as enthusiastic, sober, creative, sincere, etc.); see also infra Section II.B.
44 Indeed, the American Association of Universities study that generated the now
(in)famous one-in-five statistic counted having sex for “promised rewards” as sexual assault.
DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT
AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2015), https://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAU_Publications/
AAU_Reports/Sexual_Assault_Campus_Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf
[hereinafter AAU Study].
38
39
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morally self-evident, is thus really the outcome of a struggle between
various value judgments about whether sex can be instrumental rather
than hedonistic, whether sex is the type of life-decision that must be
deeply contemplated or something people just go with, and whether we
look at sex from a male or female perspective. 45 Accordingly, the
language of consent can preclude open political debate on, for example,
the permissibility of grudging, hasty, or even undesired sex―an issue
sociological studies indicate is more complex than one might initially
think. Studies find that college students, female and male, widely agree
to “unwanted sex,” meaning sex that is not physically desired. They
engage in this unwanted sex for a variety of reasons, including status
and relationship intimacy, 46 and such sex actually produces positive
outcomes. 47
B.

Step 2: A’s External Manifestations

Step 2 reflects the instinct that consensual sex requires partners to
communicate with each other. Given that sexual interaction is itself
communicative, absolutely unexpressive sex will be rare. Thus, the
primary issue is which external acts communicate willingness (and
which do not). A popular view is that consenters just tell people they
want to do something. For example, one expert opines: “Parties who
mutually desire sexual intimacy normally communicate that desire
freely.” 48 However, sexual consent negotiation is highly context specific
45 This is necessarily the case given that any “determinations that contracts (or sexual
relations or criminal conspiracies) were freely entered into are not determinations about ‘what
happened,’ but rather they are value-based decisions about what should be considered choice.”
Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance?: The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy
and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369, 1385 (1992) (book review); cf. West,
supra note 24, at 246 (noting that willingness can mark the line between criminal and
noncriminal but is not co-extensive with well-being).
46 See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Stephen W. Cook, Men’s Self-Reports of Unwanted
Sexual Activity, 24 J. SEX RES. 58 (1988); Lucia F. O’Sullivan & Elizabeth Rice Allgeier, Feigning
Sexual Desire: Consenting to Unwanted Sexual Activity in Heterosexual Dating Relationships, 35
J. SEX RES. 234 (1998); Susan Sprecher et al., Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent
to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J.
SEX RES. 125 (1994). For a fascinating literature survey on sexual compliance and sexual
sacrifice, see Emily A. Impett & Letitia A. Peplau, Sexual Compliance: Gender, Motivational,
and Relationship Perspectives, 40 J. SEX RES. 87 (2003). But see Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape,
Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 380 (1993) (likening sex resulting
from “women’s desire to please men because of cultural expectations of feminine conduct” to
sex produced by threat or fear).
47 See O’Sullivan & Allgeier, supra note 46.
48 Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670. Kudos to Fred Bloom for noticing the double
layered use of “normally.”
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and culturally ordered. 49 Further, considering the long Anglo-American
history of not communicating forthrightly about sexual desire, it would
follow that internal mental states are unlikely to have some obvious and
clear relationship to external manifestations. Indeed the social science
on sexual consent, which we will examine in detail in Part III, confirms
that people are normally recondite about their sexual intentions. 50
Thus, the Step 2 external manifestations are not necessarily linearly
reflective of the Step 1 internal decision. A decision to or not to have sex
can generate a range of variable and even contradictory manifestations,
conditioned on many factors like community norms, relationship status,
age, gender, sexual orientation, and individual personality. Some of the
factors influencing sexual communicative practices—for example,
stereotypical sex roles—are not palatable and reflect various inequalities
and harms experienced by complainants individually and women
generally. Thus, the way people do communicate sexual willingness
might differ from the way we think they should. And it might lead us to
embrace the problematic belief―explored later―that instead of
addressing the inequalities underlying the prevailing sex script, we
should randomly punish some who engage the script in the hope that it
will change the world.
C.

Step 3: B’s Understanding of A’s Mental State

In a perfect consent transaction, B’s belief that A mentally agreed to
sex will be a correct interpretation of A’s external manifestations. Things
get more difficult when there is a discrepancy between B’s belief and A’s
actual state of mind. For example, B might interpret A’s manifestations
as indicating willingness, when, in fact, A is adamantly opposed to the
sexual act. 51 Indeed, studies show that men are prone to interpret
“friendly” behavior as consent, while women view consent as requiring
verbalization. 52 Most scholars would say that B is permitted to have sex
if he has a reasonable belief that A is willing. 53 Nevertheless, there
See Sprecher et al., supra note 46, at 126.
See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
51 Alternatively, B might be convinced that A is unwilling and decide to pursue sex anyway,
but, in fact, A is quietly enthusiastic. We would probably consider B a pretty bad person and a
walking hazard, but the requirement of actus reus would foreclose liability.
52 See Antonia Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions for Friendly Behavior: Do Males
Misperceive Females’ Friendliness?, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1982); Susan E.
Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, “By the Semi-Mystical Appearance of a Condom”: How
Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX
RES. 258 (1999); Terry P. Humphreys & Mélanie M. Brousseau, The Sexual Consent Scale—
Revised: Development, Reliability, and Preliminary Validity, 47 J. SEX RES. 420, 421 (2010).
53 There may be a case for strict liability in a particular class of “public welfare offenses,”
49
50
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remains the perennial problem of the meaning of reasonableness in an
unreasonable world. 54 Where sexist norms prevail and “reasonable”
people presume women consent unless they resist, requiring
reasonableness will hardly produce justice. 55 Rape reformers who regard
the reasonable belief standard as too lenient turn to affirmative consent.
The goal is to identify a limited set of external manifestations indicative
of consent to nonsexist people. If such manifestations are not present, B
is guilty regardless of whether B believed A was willing, and in fact the
larger (sexist) society would agree with B’s assessment. We will discuss
affirmative consent in more detail in the next two Parts.
It gets even more complicated when we subjectivize B’s intent. If B
is totally clueless, has an overinflated self-image of sexiness, or adheres
to a defective sexual script, B might honestly believe that A agreed to
sex, even though reasonable people would have read A’s behavior
otherwise. B might in fact be horrified to know the sex was undesired.
Nevertheless, B’s actions, though well-intentioned, are negligent, and
the question becomes whether we should punish a person who honestly
but negligently misinterprets external manifestations. Unreasonable
actions that harm others typically generate civil, rather than criminal,
liability. 56 Under general criminal law principles, B is not liable for rape
if B honestly (or non-recklessly) believed A was willing, regardless of the
reasonableness of this view. 57 Nevertheless, many jurisdictions do adopt
a negligence standard for sexual assault. 58 This leads to the criticism that
negligence is imprecise and overly punitive, given the variability in how
people define reasonably prudent sexual behavior. 59 All this said, for

because of the danger and difficulty in proving intent, but lack of intent is generally anathema
in individual traditional crimes. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952).
54 This reasonable-racist/sexist/homophobe problem comes up in a variety of situations in
criminal law. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); see also Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781
(1994); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591 (1981).
55 See, e.g., Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE
L.J. 2687 (1991).
56 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) cmt. 5 at 244 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
57 See, e.g., MPC Draft No. 5, supra note 10, at 147 (“If the actor honestly and sincerely
believes a sexual overture is welcomed, there should not be liability even if the other person in
fact found the date insufferable, and yet continued to be politely accommodating.”).
58 See id. at 169 (surveying case law and concluding that a negligence mens rea for
unconsensual sex is the “prevailing view in contemporary American case law”).
59 See id. at 171 (noting the “concern[] that a negligence standard in this context will result
in penal liability greatly disproportionate to fault”).
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most theorists, so long as B acts within reasonable communicative
norms, B has acted lawfully. 60
In sum, an uncontroversial sexual consent transaction involves: (1)
A’s internal decision to have sex; (2) A’s external manifestations of that
decision; and (3) B’s (reasonable) belief, based on the external
manifestations and context, that A is willing to have sex. In the typical
contested consent case, A claims the sex was internally unwanted. B
responds either that A did internally agree, that B (reasonably) believed
A internally agreed, or both. The jury, not being mind-readers, will
resolve the issue by looking at A’s external manifestations in context.
The tricky part is that decision-makers harbor a wide spectrum of views
as to what constitutes internal willingness, how that willingness is or
should be manifested, and how a person should interpret those
manifestations.
II. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
Determining whether there is a valid consent transaction in any
given case is a difficult task. There are so many pieces to the puzzle of
internal willingness, external manifestation, and defendant’s mens rea,
not to mention disputes over what occurred, creating credibility
contests. The ordinary consent standard leaves it to police officers,
prosecutors, and jurors to determine the parameters of a consensual
mental state and divine the proper meaning of external manifestations.
Rape reformers are rightfully concerned that such decision-makers can
make bad calls by, for example, finding subtly coerced agreement valid,
invariably deriving willingness from silence, or allowing the defendant
too much leeway to interpret any behavior as consent. To reduce the
risk of bad calls, reformers advocate for affirmative consent. 61
Affirmative consent laws direct decision-makers to focus on what
complainants do or say, and not on what they intend. Step one is no
longer part of the picture. This is not a radical change, given that jurors
in ordinary consent cases generally look at the external manifestations
in context to determine the complainant’s mental state. 62 It is the second
60 See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 26, at 1102–03; Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know:
Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 67 (1993) (advocating that “the
minimum culpable mens rea as to consent should be negligence”).
61 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 426 (2000) [hereinafter
Bryden, Redefining Rape]; see, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277–78 (N.J. 1992).
62 The exception would be an ordinary consent case where the complainant was silent,
passive, or resisting, but he sent a text right after the sex stating: “I just had the best sexual
experience and was totally happy that my partner took control.” Here, the jury might acquit,
determining that the complainant internally agreed to the sex based, not on his external
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directive that drives the passionate debate: only certain step two external
manifestations count as “affirmative consent.” Affirmative consent
reforms narrow the world of communicative performances that make
sex permissible.
The meaning of “affirmative consent,” nevertheless, is not uniform,
and can range from narrow communicative prescriptions (contract,
verbal yes) to any behavior that conveys internal agreement (foreplay,
acquiescence). Narrow formulations protect victims but appear sexregulatory and unfair to defendants. However, broad formulations that
allow any words, conduct, or omissions to establish affirmative consent
are not much of a reform at all. A number criminal rape statutes include
some form of affirmative consent. But these laws are notoriously vague,
requiring, for example, “positive cooperation” or “freely given
agreement” without specifying whether that cooperation or agreement
requires something more than participation without protest, and what
that something more is.63 The below categories of affirmative consent
are culled from the vast amount of criminal law, educational policy,
scholarship, media commentary, and internet discussion regarding
affirmative consent. Here is a spectrum of affirmative consent
formulations from more sex-regulatory/prosecutorial to less sexregulatory/lenient:

manifestations at the time of the encounter, but the later text. In this case, an affirmative
consent standard, which eliminates step one from the inquiry, would make a big difference,
even if it permitted any type of external manifestation to count as affirmative consent.
63 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2014) (“positive cooperation in act or attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-1.70 (West 2002)
(“freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West
2005) (“words or overt actions by . . . indicating a freely given agreement”); In re M.T.S., 609
A.2d at 1277 (“affirmatively and freely given authorization”). For a current accounting of the
various types of affirmative consent laws, see Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12; Tuerkheimer,
Affirmative Consent, supra note 25; and MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 58–61. Thus, the below
standards are primarily taken from university conduct codes, which tend to be more specific
about affirmative consent.
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Figure 2: The Affirmative Consent Scale
The following Sections examine each formulation, starting with the
most regulatory.
A.

The Contract

The most restrictive construction of affirmative consent―the
signed, notarized, contract in triplicate―is largely, although not
exclusively, a product of the derisive discourse of rape reform
opponents, who seek to provoke public ridicule of affirmative consent. 64
That said, it is not completely fallacious to ally the sex contract with
anti-rape activism. Commentary on the web extolls the written contract
as a good way to manage sexual communication. 65 Indeed, on
affirmativeconsent.com, one can purchase “Affirmative Consent Kits”
for $12.00, which include “Yes Means Yes Cards.” 66 The website is part
of the “Affirmative Consent Project,” a group that lobbies law and
policy makers to adopt affirmative consent standards. 67 Founder Alison
Berke Morano asserts the cards are not a joke: “We’re trying to change
64 See Callie Beusman, ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws Will Not Ruin Sex Forever, Despite Idiotic
Fears, JEZEBEL (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/yes-means-yes-laws-will-not-ruinsex-forever-despite-i-1630704944.
65 See, e.g., Betsy Gallup, Sex Contracts, LOVE TO KNOW, http://dating.lovetoknow.com/
Sex_Contracts (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
66 See AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT, http://www.affirmativeconsent.com (last visited Oct. 5,
2016). The price of the packet in 2015 was a mere $2.99.
67 Maura Lerner, National Group Hopes to Stir Talk with Its Sex Consent Contracts, STAR
TRIB. (July 9, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://www.startribune.com/group-hopes-to-stir-talk-with-itssex-consent-contracts/312694551.
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the conversation and make people more secure,” she explained to the
press. 68
B.

An Enthusiastic Yes

A step down from the signed contract formulation of affirmative
consent is the requirement of an “enthusiastic” verbal yes. Reflective
(and reflexive) of the maligned no-means-yes trope, this requirement
holds that yes means no, unless the yes is declared with alacrity. 69 The
“enthusiastic yes” mantra is repeated in freshman orientations and
enshrined in the feminist blogosphere. 70 In some ways, the requirement
of perpetual enthusiasm might be more difficult to attain than even the
signed contract in triplicate. One blogger opines:
“Sex” is an evolving series of actions and interactions. You have to
have the enthusiastic consent of your partner for all of them. And
even if you have your partner’s consent for a particular activity, you
have to be prepared for it to change. . . . [I]f you want to have sex,
you have to be continually in a state of enthusiastic consent with
your partner. 71

The requirement of an enthusiastic expression is related to the new
feminist ideology that sex is gender oppression unless the woman
(typically envisioned as the sex acceptor) engages in it deliberatively and
hedonistically. 72 The enthusiastic yes reform thus weighs in both on the
quality of a consenting mental state and the character of the
68 Blake Neff, Sexual Consent Contracts Are Now A Real Thing You Can Buy, DAILY
CALLER (July 8, 2015, 8:52 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/07/08/sexual-consent-contractsare-now-a-real-thing-you-can-buy/#ixzz3udpy8nCO; see also Lerner, supra note 67.
69 See, e.g., YALE UNIV., 2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 21 (2014), http://your.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/Yale%20Clery%20Report%202013.pdf (stating that the University directs
students to “[h]old out for enthusiasm”); ELON UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 8 (2013),
http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/bft/safety/Elon%20University%20ASR%202013.pdf (consent
is “comprehensible, unambiguous, positive, and enthusiastic”); see also Gersen & Suk, supra
note 43, at 924–30 (discussing the enthusiasm requirement).
70 See Cheryl Corley, HBCUs Move to Address Campus Sexual Assaults, but Is It Enough?,
NPR (Sept. 29, 2014, 3:26 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/29/351534164/hbcus-move-toaddress-campus-sexual-assaults-but-is-it-enough (describing a Title IX hearing at Howard
University where the administrator stated, “[r]epeat after me—an enthusiastic yes”).
71 Jaclyn Friedman, Consent Is Not a Lightswitch, AMPLIFY: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2010), http://
amplifyyourvoice.org/u/Yes_Means_Yes/2010/11/9/Consent-Is-Not-A-Lightswitch.
72 See, e.g., Creating a Culture of Consent, HARV. U. OFF. OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION
& RESPONSE, http://osapr.harvard.edu/creating-culture-consent (last visited Oct. 23, 2016)
(embedding into the notion of consent that each person is “sincere in their desires” and that
they “know[] and feel[]—without a doubt—that the other person is excited to engage [in sexual
conduct]”).
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performance. Both must be carnal and ebullient. In times past, the sex
regulatory tendency was toward instrumentalist intercourse, strictly for
reproductive purposes. Today’s regulatory impulses tend toward
sybaritic sex, strictly for (hetero female-style) pleasure purposes. 73
C.

Yes Means Yes

Moving down the line, a more common formulation of affirmative
consent is the requirement of a verbal yes. Reformers, activists, and
college administrators tout this threshold as necessary to ensure that
one’s sexual partner has internally agreed to sex. 74 Nonetheless, even
those sympathetic to clear modes of sexual communication
acknowledge that insisting on a specific word to legitimate sex is
artificial and unrealistic, given the heterodoxy of intimate signaling.
Thus, while “only yes means yes” is a catchy sound bite, for many
affirmative consent proponents, the permission script can be more
variable. 75 In this view, one does not have to ask for and receive a “yes,”
but there are communicative hurdles that must be traversed. Thus, a
common formulation of affirmative consent dictates that a person
seeking intercourse must stop, explicitly seek permission, and obtain
permission in some clear form.
D.

Stop and Ask

The stop-and-ask approach, which appears frequently in university
policies, puts a legally enforceable obligation on the sex proponent to
73 And what is pleasurable to women is conceived of in very narrow and gendered terms as
sensitive, communicative, loving, committed, gentle sex. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 206–07 (2001); cf.
Chamallas, supra note 28, at 839 (advocating regulation to encourage “reservation of sex for
intimacy and pleasure,” but not through criminal law).
74 Although most colleges do not require verbal consent, they counsel strongly in favor of it.
See, e.g., Amherst College Sexual Misconduct and Harassment Policy, AMHERST C., https://
www.amherst.edu/campuslife/health-safety-wellness/sexual-respect/sexual-misconduct-andharassment-policy/node/497976 (“Relying on non-verbal communication can lead to
misunderstandings. . . . In the absence of an outward demonstration, consent does not exist.”);
cf. Tovia Smith, Campuses Consider Following New York’s Lead On ‘Yes Means Yes’ Policy, NPR
(July 8, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225048/campuses-considerfollowing-new-yorks-lead-on-yes-means-yes-policy
(quoting
Governor
Cuomo
as
characterizing New York’s affirmative consent bill as requiring “[t]he other person . . . to say
yes. It’s yes on both sides.”).
75 See The Johns Hopkins University Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures, JOHNS
HOPKINS U., http://sexualassault.jhu.edu/policies-laws/#Section%20III%20-%20Definitions
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Johns Hopkins Policy] (requiring “a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or
otherwise”).
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stop the sexual interaction, expressly seek permission for a specific act,
and obtain a “yes” or its functional equivalent from the sex acceptor. 76
California’s highly publicized and controversial affirmative consent law,
for example, mandates that university conduct codes define consent as
“affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual
activity” and specify that “[i]t is the responsibility of each person
involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the
affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual
activity.” 77 This language, like that of many affirmative consent statutes,
permits a variety of interpretations. Alarmist opponents call it the sex
contract. 78 Defenders say that the law merely demands consent in its
ordinary sense. 79 Despite its somewhat ambiguous nature, the law does
appear to require some stop-and-ask ritual.

76 See, e.g., Gender-Based Misconduct Policy for Students, COLUM. U. 7 (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresfor
Students.pdf [hereinafter Columbia Policy] (“If there is confusion or ambiguity, participants in
sexual activity need to stop and talk about each person’s willingness to continue.”); Policy on
Harassment, Discrimination, and Sexual Misconduct, U. CHI., https://studentmanual
.uchicago.edu/page/policy-harassment-discrimination-and-sexual-misconduct#Consent (last
updated Aug. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Chicago Policy] (“It is the responsibility of the person who
wants to engage in a sexual activity to obtain the consent of the other person for that sexual
activity.”); Policy on Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment and Other Forms of Interpersonal
Violence, U. VA. 13 (July 1, 2015), https://vpsa.virginia.edu/sites/vpsa.virginia.edu/files/Title%
20IX%20VAWA%20Umbrella%20Policy.pdf (“stop and clarify”); Prohibited Sexual Conduct:
Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Assault, Stalking, Relationship Violence, Violation of University or
Court Directives, Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and Retaliation, STAN. U. (Mar. 11,
2016), https://adminguide.stanford.edu/printpdf/chapter-1/subchapter-7/policy-1-7-3
[hereinafter Stanford Policy] (“It is the responsibility of person(s) involved in sexual activity to
ensure that he/she/they have the affirmative consent of the other . . . .”); Student Sexual
Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to Title IX, DUKE U., https://
studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/z-policies/student-sexual-misconduct-policy-dukescommitment-title-ix#consent (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Duke Policy] (“[I]t is
essential that each participant stops and clarifies, verbally, willingness to continue.”); Wesleyan
University 2016–2017 University Standards and Regulations, WESLEYAN U. 23, http://
www.wesleyan.edu/studentaffairs/studenthandbook/StudentHandbook.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2016) [hereinafter Wesleyan Code] (“It is the responsibility of the person who wants to engage
in sexual activity to insure consent of their partner(s).”). The MPC draft makes some overtures
toward the stop-and-ask model, stating that “the more assertive party [must] ensure
receptiveness to each more intimate or different act of penetration,” but ultimately leaves it to
the jury to determine whether there is consent “on the basis of all the circumstances.” MPC
Draft 5, supra note 10, at 73.
77 S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). The name of the bill is “Student
Safety: Sexual Assault,” but it is widely referred to as the “Affirmative Consent” or even “YesMeans-Yes” bill.
78 See, e.g., Beusman, supra note 64; Yehuda Remer, California To Redefine Sex As Rape,
TRUTH REVOLT (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/california-redefine-sex-rape.
79 See, e.g., Beusman, supra note 64.
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Under the California law, the sex proponent must “ensure” that
there is affirmative consent. 80 Elsewhere, the law requires “reasonable
steps . . . to ascertain whether the complainant affirmatively
consented.”81 One plausible reading of this language is that a person has
to do no more than look for reasonable signs of agreement. However,
the word “ensure” indicates that sex proponents must, in some
meaningful sense, guarantee consent. One might accordingly be
concerned that ensuring consent requires magic words or, worse, a
document to record consent. 82 And now the sex contract interpretation
seems a bit less like conservative men’s paranoia. 83
More likely, the “ensure” language obligates sex proponents, before
and frequently during a make-out session, to stop and ask for
permission, something like, “Do you want to do it?,” or as one
university public awareness video counsels, “Do you want to bump and
grind with me?” 84 The sex acceptor must then give an indication of
permission, something like a thumbs up, or “I would really like to bump
and grind with you.” 85 Some of the stop-and-ask scripts offered by
college administrators and activists verge on humorous, reminiscent of
spoof 1970s pick-up lines. One university pamphlet, “Making Consent
Fun,” suggests procuring consent through questions like, “Baby, you
want to make a bunk bed: me on top, you on bottom?” and “Would you
like to try an Australian kiss? It’s like a French kiss, but ‘Down
Under.’” 86 Or consider these directives from a “sex-positive” feminist
blogger for attaining consent: “Describe a hot fantasy before you hit the
bedroom,” and “Use your body as a guide: You can’t go grabbing
someone else’s parts without asking, but you can definitely grab at your
own.”87 These suggestions illustrate the difficulty in formulating the
ideal enlightened-but-sexy consent script.

S.B. 967; see also Wesleyan Code, supra note 76, at 23 (using the word “insure”).
S.B. 967.
82 Indeed, some policies require that people “verbally clarify” ambiguous consent. See, e.g.,
Columbia Policy, supra note 76.
83 See supra Section II.A.
84 SAVP Vassar, How do I Ask For Consent?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbyaFyr2h6Q.
85 Id.
86 Where is Your Line: Consent is Sexy!, U. WYO., http://www.uwyo.edu/stop/resources/
10_stop_consent_sexy_booklet.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). See Gersen & Suk, supra note 43,
at 928–29 for more examples.
87 Kristen Sollee, 4 Sexy Ways To Ask For Consent, Because It Can Be A Turn-On, BUSTLE
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://bustle.com/articles/103236-4-sexy-ways-to-ask-for-consent-because-itcan-be-a-turn-on.
80
81
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Clear and Contemporaneous Consent

The next formulation of affirmative consent falls between stopand-ask and the world of Step 2 external manifestations. A number of
sexual consent policies do not require magic words or an ask-andanswer process, but they do demand “clear” agreement specific to and
contemporaneous with a particular sexual act. 88 Here, affirmative
consent to sex cannot just be a make-out session, but must involve some
relatively unequivocal communication of agreement to the particular
sex act. When pressed, commentators have difficulty identifying the line
between foreplay that demonstrates consent to just that foreplay and
foreplay that demonstrates consent to more intimate sexual acts. 89 The
important thing is that in this version of affirmative consent, such a line
exists, which means that only a subset of make-out sessions count as
affirmative consent to sexual penetration.
That subset can be broader or narrower. Many commentators hold
that “kissing alone” is not affirmative consent to penetrative intercourse,
but otherwise decline to delineate which intimate activities constitute
“clear” agreement. 90 A good number of scholars and most university
policies go further and maintain that affirmative consent must be
specific to “each act,” that is, every stage of the sexual proceedings. 91
This would indicate that kissing does not communicate consent to
breast touching, breast touching does not communicate consent to
genital touching, genital touching does not communicate consent to
oral sex, and oral sex does not communicate consent to genital
88 See, e.g., Prohibited Student Conduct: Sexual Assault, CORNELL U., http://
titleix.cornell.edu/prohibited-conduct/sexual-assault (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (defining
affirmative consent as “words or actions [that] create clear permission”); Sexual Misconduct, U.
COLO. (July 1, 2015), http://www.cu.edu/sites/default/files/5014.pdf [hereinafter Colorado
Policy] (“unambiguous . . . agreement”); Sexual Respect: Definitions, DARTMOUTH C., http://
www.dartmouth.edu/sexualrespect/definitions.html#consent (last updated Feb. 3, 2015) (“clear
and unambiguous agreement, expressed in mutually understandable words or action”); Yale
Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, YALE U., http://smr.yale.edu/sexual-mis
conduct-policies-and-definitions (last updated May 10, 2016) (“unambiguous . . . agreement”);
see also SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 271 (advocating “permission
. . . clearly communicated”).
89 See infra note 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of foreplay).
90 See, e.g., Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” but What
Does “Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2345–46 (2004) (critiquing general view that
consent to one activity implies consent to another).
91 See, e.g., Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment, Sexual Violence, Relationship and
Interpersonal Violence and Stalking Policy, BROWN U. 7 (Sept. 2, 2016), https://
www.brown.edu/about/administration/title-ix/sites/brown.edu.about.administration.title-ix/
files/uploads/policy-final-sept-16.pdf [hereinafter Brown Policy] (affirmative consent to “each
instance of sexual contact”).
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penetration. 92 In this view, there must be some additional (although not
always specified) expression that conveys clear agreement to a sex act in
a way that participation in the overall intimate encounter does not. 93
A similar requirement of consent contemporaneity specifies that
present consent cannot be inferred from past consent or an existing
sexual relationship. 94 Sex proponents may be permitted to contextualize
external manifestations (i.e., kissing and petting), with recent
occurrences (i.e., the sex acceptor said “take the lead tonight”). They
may not, however, contextualize that same kissing and petting with past
evidence (i.e., on ten previous occasions, petting led to sex). Although
most of these policies do not say that past intimacy or relationship status
is completely irrelevant, they do single out past events/relationship as
“not indicative” of present consent. 95 This suggests that the external
manifestations must be the type that would clearly convey sexual
willingness to a stranger, even if the sex occurs between two people in an
existing sexual relationship. 96
A concept related to contemporaneity, which appears frequently in
expert commentary and university handbooks, is that affirmative

92 See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1420 (2005);
Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (“Consent to one form of sexual activity does not imply
consent to other forms of sexual activity.”); see also Duke Policy, supra note 76; Sexual Assault,
Stalking and Relationship Violence, U. MINN. app. (Aug. 2015), https://policy.umn.edu/
operations/sexualassault [hereinafter Minnesota Policy]; Sexual Misconduct, EMORY U. (Sept.
26, 2016), https://policies.emory.edu/8.2. The MPC draft “requires consent for each act of
sexual penetration” and states that “consenting to oral sex act does not necessarily imply
permission to engage in vaginal or anal sex.” MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 73 (emphasis
added). However, it also “leaves room for . . . interpretive disputes about how to understand
such words and conduct under all the circumstances.” Id.
93 The now-infamous Antioch College Sexual Offense Prevention Policy attempted to
specify such temporal lines, stating: “Verbal consent should be obtained with each new level of
physical and/or sexual behavior in any given interaction, regardless of who initiates it. Asking
‘Do you want to have sex with me?’ is not enough. The request for consent must be specific to
each act.” A 1996 version of the policy, originally passed in 1993, is available at http://
www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/jhamlin/3925/Readings/Antioch.html. Its radical nature drew
biting ridicule. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 687 (1999)
(discussing “vitriolic criticisms” in the media).
94 See Brown Policy, supra note 91, at 7 (past or present relationship does not necessarily
imply consent); Chicago Policy, supra note 76; Stanford Policy, supra note 76; sources cited
supra note 92 (consent to one act is not consent to another).
95 Compare Chicago Policy, supra note 76 (sexual relationship does not “in and of itself”
constitute consent), and Stanford Policy, supra note 76 (dating relationship does not “by itself”
indicate consent), with Colorado Policy, supra note 88 (previous and current sexual
relationships “do not imply consent”), and Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (previous
relationship “is not consent to sexual activity”).
96 See Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (“The definition of consent does not vary based
upon . . . relationship status.”).
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consent must be “continuous,” “persistent,” or “ongoing.”97 In terms of
internal consent, continuous agreement is epistemologically
problematic if it renders sex unconsensual whenever a party has a
fleeting second thought. More plausible is that persistent consent means
there must be an overall mental state of agreement, even though
uncertainty or hesitation might occasionally crop up. The requirement
of ongoing external consent is similarly confounding. What exactly does
a continuous communication of agreement look, or sound, like? The
requirement of ongoing performative consent must instead mean
something like specific consent to each critical act. 98
F.

Contextual Consent and No Means No

I will end this parsing of affirmative consent by touching on
formulations that are related to, and sometimes even called, “affirmative
consent,” although they are very far from yes means yes, stop and ask,
and clear consent standards. Several past drafts of the MPC sexual
assault revisions purport to establish “affirmative consent,” but in fact
set up a standard in which nearly all external manifestations can, in
context, count as evidence of internal agreement. 99 In fact, the MPC
standard acknowledges that silence and passivity can sometimes
communicate consent. 100 However, there is a meaningful limitation on
this free reign to interpret the external manifestations: when a person
utters a verbal refusal, one must presume that the person is unwilling,
regardless of the overall context. 101
Some may be concerned that no means no is too artificial, given
that young people sometimes engage in perfunctory and duplicitous
sexual protest. 102 The MPC draft, however, tempers the directive: “no”
can be countered by any subsequent―though curiously not preceding or
simultaneous―words or actions indicating consent. 103 Accordingly,
97 See, e.g., S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (“Affirmative consent must
be ongoing throughout a sexual activity.”); Johns Hopkins Policy, supra note 75; Minnesota
Policy, supra note 92, app.; Stanford Policy, supra note 76.
98 Thus “ongoing” is used in counter-distinction to irrevocable. See, e.g., Stanford Policy,
supra note 76 (“Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be
revoked at any time.”).
99 See, e.g., MPC Draft 5, supra note 10. The January 2016 Council Draft wisely drops the
“affirmative consent” label in favor of “contextual consent,” but the standard still requires
expressive consent and presumes that no means no. See MPC Revisions, supra note 10.
100 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 34.
101 Id. at 53.
102 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
103 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 54.
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assessing a package of external manifestations that includes a “no” is
identical to an ordinary consent assessment, so long as something
performative followed the “no.” And since the draft counts even passive
engagement as consent performance, its no-means-no rule would
primarily affect cases where the “no” immediately precedes the relevant
sex act. In any case, even a stricter no-means-no rule is a far cry from
the type of regulation represented by the various affirmative consent
formulas examined above. This is precisely why activists urge the move
from no means no to yes means yes. 104
Finally, some laws make sex a rape only when the victim expressly
refuses or resists. These refusal laws, like New York’s felony provision
requiring that “the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not
consent,” differ substantially from laws that punish any unconsensual
sex. 105 Refusal laws might not criminalize a situation where the victim
was clearly unwilling but did not openly protest. For example, in one
California case, the defendant awoke the complainant, a houseguest
sleeping in the living room, from a deep slumber, quickly penetrated
her, ejaculated, and left. 106 The lethargic and surprised complainant had
no time to protest. 107 Although the California court ultimately found
nonconsent (and force), 108 one could imagine such a defendant being
acquitted under a refusal law. 109 However, the alternative to a
presumption of willingness in the absence of explicit refusal does not
have to be a presumption of unwillingness in the absence of explicit
affirmative agreement. Rather, an ordinary consent law could refrain
from presupposing―and dictating canons of sexual interpretation
reflecting―a general human disposition toward sex (desirous or
repulsed). It instead can direct decision-makers to focus on the details of
the sexual interaction, without any presumptions about an overall
stance toward sex.

104 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational
Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321 (2005); see also
Jake New, More College Campuses Swap ‘No Means No’ for ‘Yes Means Yes’, PBS (Oct. 17, 2014,
1:04 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/means-enough-college-campuses.
105 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2009); see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-318(8),
319(1) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402(1), 406(1) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2015).
106 People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 61–
62 (indicating this case evidences the need for affirmative consent).
107 Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1185.
108 Id. at 1190.
109 Then again, this might not happen. See State v. Lisasuain, 117 A.3d 1154, 1158 (N.H.
2015) (finding passive behavior without refusal to satisfy rape statute requiring victims to
“indicate[] by speech or conduct that there is not freely given consent”).
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Having examined the various formulations of affirmative consent,
from more to less regulatory, let us now turn to the arguments for and
against them.
III. THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT DEBATE
The preceding Part emphasized the great variability in what
affirmative consent is. There is perhaps even greater diversity and
perplexity regarding why affirmative consent is desirable. The
justifications and criticisms of affirmative consent sometimes assume
strong and sometimes assume weak versions of the standard. “Briefs”
for and against the standard can be self-contradictory. For example,
affirmative consent is sometimes rationalized on the ground that the
rule simply codifies actual sexual practice. 110 Other times, supporters
articulate a directly contradictory claim, namely, that because of
widespread sexist practices, affirmative consent policies are necessary to
provoke “cultural change.” 111 This Part catalogues affirmative consent
arguments in an effort to give the reader clarity on the standard’s
empirical and normative justifications. It should be noted that the
persuasiveness of any given argument is dependent, to some extent, on
which affirmative consent formulation it assumes. In addition, some
commentators find strict affirmative consent standards tolerable in the
college discipline, but not criminal, context. 112 There are four types of
justifications of affirmative consent: empirical, aspirational, retributive,
and distributional.
A.

The Empirical Argument: Affirmative Consent Reflects Sexual
Practice

Affirmative consent reforms respond, in large part, to the problem
that decision-makers can interpret external manifestations incorrectly
and impermissibly. According to the argument, jurors and state actors,
due to prejudice or mistake, will regard too wide a range of
performances as indicating internal willingness. 113 There are
See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
112 This Article does not deeply probe the distinction between college discipline and criminal
prosecution.
113 See, e.g., Beatrice Diehl, Note, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty,
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 508 (2015) (stating that an affirmative consent standard will
combat jurors’ adherence to “rape myths” about how women communicate about sex and
110
111
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undoubtedly some prejudiced decision-makers who view women who
act sexy, go to parties, get drunk, etc., as “deserving” of sexual assault
and simply ignore the legal question of consent. However, requiring
affirmative consent will hardly affect a decision-maker determined to
focus on the complainant’s “precipitating” behavior. A sexist jury set on
acquitting will simply ignore the affirmative consent standard just as it
would a regular consent standard. 114
Affirmative consent advocates more likely have in mind decisionmakers who inaccurately assess external manifestations due to incorrect
views about how people communicate sexual willingness―views that
may be influenced by gender stereotypes. In reality, reformers contend,
people do not say “no” when they mean “yes,” people move from
foreplay to sex only after forthright discussion, and people are active
rather than passive when they want sex. 115 Affirmative consent
proponents often simply declare the truth of their observations about
actual sexual negotiation.”116 For example, one scholar pronounces that
it is a “myth” to believe that “‘no’ does not always mean ‘no.’” 117
In promoting their views of the empirical world of sex, activists
sometimes play fast-and-loose with social science. Rape theorist
Michelle Anderson, for example, advocates a form of stop-and-ask that
criminalizes sexual penetration not preceded by open negotiation. 118 She
rationalizes this reform in part by asserting that under existing “social
and sexual mores,” people candidly negotiate before each act of sexual
penetration―an observation that might run counter to common
instincts regarding sexual interaction. 119 Anderson bases this conclusion
about sexual consent on a national survey of young adults’ sexual health,
which asked: “Thinking about your current sexual or most recent sexual
relationship, have you ever talked to your partner about what you feel
comfortable doing sexually?,” to which the vast majority answered
clarify “confusion” by establishing that only yes means yes); see also supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
114 Social science indicates that jurors’ belief systems are more predictive of outcomes in
mistaken consent cases than the breadth of the legal definition of consent. See Dan M. Kahan,
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010); see also Bryden, Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 417.
115 See Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670 (characterizing open communication as
normal); cf. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 23, at 652–54 (opining that
reasonable consent will reflect a male-oriented point of view).
116 The MPC draft cites a survey in which college students called the affirmative consent
“realistic.” However, it is unclear that respondents understood the standard, given that many
thought there was “not much difference” from no means no. MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 64
& n.178 (citing WASHINGTON POST-KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, WASH. POST (2015)).
117 Diehl, supra note 113, at 508.
118 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92.
119 Id. at 1433.
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affirmatively. 120 But the fact that young people in sexual relationships at
some point talk about sex says very little about how any two people,
strangers or familiars, communicate consent on a specific sexual
occasion. The author similarly declares that foreplay often does not
indicate willingness to have intercourse. Anderson reasons from studies
indicating that women sometimes chose oral sex rather than intercourse
to preserve “technical virginity,” that engaging in extensive foreplay is
evidence of nonconsent: “The more diverse the sexual experiences
people participate in . . . the less those experiences suggest consent to
vaginal or anal penetration.” 121
Although intuition and marginally relevant surveys are familiar
bases for affirmative consent proponents’ empirical conclusions,
sociological literature on sexual consent performance appears less
frequently. Sexuality Studies is a specialized field, and as in many
developing areas of science, literature on sexual consent is in a state of
development. But the studies make one thing clear: the typical way
young people express sexual intent is precisely not by open verbal
communication. 122 Surveying the literature, sociologists Terry
Humphreys and Mélanie Brousseau observe: “Numerous studies have
demonstrated that the preferred approach to signal consent for both
women and men tends to be nonverbal instead of verbal.” 123 While the
science does indicate that people will be clearer as sexual contact
becomes more intimate, agreement even to penetration is not likely to
be a verbal ask-and-answer. Sexual consent signaling is, in fact, often
entirely passive: “[M]any men and women passively indicate their
consent to sexual intercourse by not resisting, such as allowing
themselves to be undressed by their partner, not saying no, or not
stopping their partner’s advances.” 124

120 Id. (citing HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS AND
YOUNG ADULTS: SEXUAL HEALTH KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES 19 tbl.13 (2003),
http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/3218-index.cfm).
121 Anderson, supra note 92, at 1420 (citing Lisa Remez, Oral Sex Among Adolescents: Is It
Sex or Is It Abstinence?, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 298, 298–301 (2000)).
122 Many of the studies do not claim to describe the dynamics of same-sex sexual
communication. See Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 421.
123 Id. (citing studies); see also Terry P. Humphreys, Understanding Sexual Consent: An
Empirical Investigation of the Normative Script for Young Heterosexual Adults, in MAKING
SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 209 (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004); David S. Hall,
Consent for Sexual Behavior in a College Student Population, 1 ELECTRONIC J. HUM. SEXUALITY,
Aug. 10, 1998, http://www.ejhs.org/volume1/consent1.htm; Lucia F. O’Sullivan & E. Sandra
Byers, College Students’ Incorporation of Initiator and Restrictor Roles in Sexual Dating
Interactions, 29 J. SEX RES. 435 (1992).
124 See Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 421 (citing Hall, supra note 123).
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The social science literature on sexual consent also reveals
significant and troubling gender differentials, at least within the United
States. 125 Young people continue to adhere to “traditional” sexual scripts
in which men initiate sex and women act as “gatekeepers.” 126 Relatedly,
studies document that women are keenly aware of the social costs of
breaking from the traditional script and engaging in the “wrong” kind of
sexual communication. 127 It is thus not surprising that the phenomenon
of token resistance, that is, communicating refusal when one is willing,
continues to be part of the consent performance landscape. 128
B.

The Aspirational Argument: Affirmative Consent Is a Crucial
Objective

When faced with scant evidence that sexual communication is
largely affirmative and unequivocal, affirmative consent proponents
switch to aspirational claims that people should “play it safe” and openly
negotiate consent. 129 Broad affirmative consent laws and policies, the
argument goes, will enable this behavioral shift. 130 In making this case
for strict affirmative consent laws, proponents take pains to point out
the ubiquity of unconsensual sex—touting statistics like one-in-four/five
college women experience sexual assault. 131 The vacillation between
125 These differentials may not be so pronounced in other countries. See Sprecher et al.,
supra note 46, at 130.
126 Hickman & Muehlenhard, supra note 52, at 259 (citing studies); Annika M. Johnson &
Stephanie M. Hoover, The Potential of Sexual Consent Interventions on College Campuses: A
Literature Review on the Barriers to Establishing Affirmative Sexual Consent, 4 PURE INSIGHTS,
2015, http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=pure (citing
studies).
127 See Michael W. Wiederman, The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts, 13 FAM. J. 496
(2005).
128 For a fascinating retrospective on the study of “token resistance,” see Charlene L.
Muehlenhard, Examining Stereotypes About Token Resistance to Sex, 35 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 676
(2011); see also Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No
When They Mean Yes?, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (1988); O’Sullivan & Allgeier,
supra note 46.
129 See, e.g., Jaclyn Friedman, Adults Hate ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws. The College Students I Meet
Love Them, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2015/10/14/adults-hate-affirmative-consent-laws-the-college-students-i-meet-love-them/?utm_
term=.80cb345897ed.
130 See, e.g., Little, supra note 104, at 1356 (analogizing affirmative consent to civil rights
laws that “led popular culture”).
131 See, e.g., Morgan Baskin, Controversial 1-in-5 Sexual Assault Statistic Validated in New
National Survey, USA TODAY C. (Sept. 21, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/
09/21/controversial-1-in-5-sexual-assault-statistic-validated-in-new-national-survey;
Tara
Culp-Ressler, Study Finds ‘Epidemic Level’ Of Rape On College Campus, THINKPROGRESS (May
20, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2015/05/20/3661010/campus-rape-surveys; see also
AAU Study, supra note 44 (one-in-four study); CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS
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characterizing the young adult sexual world as one of enlightened
consent communication and rampant unconsensual sex seems
inescapably contradictory.
Some reformers attempt escape by asserting that what accounts for
the prevalence of unconsensual sex is not ordinary college boys—they
stop and ask―but deviant “serial rapists” who hide behind lax
disciplinary policies. Consider Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s comments:
“These are not dates gone bad, or a good guy who had too much to
drink. This is a crime largely perpetrated by repeat offenders, who
instead of facing a prosecutor and a jail cell, remain on campus after a
short-term suspension, if punished at all.” 132 However, if aberrant
offenders who force sex or clandestinely administer drugs are the
problem, then there is little justification for requiring everyone to get a
“yes.” 133 Moreover, it appears that young men likely to engage in rapelike behavior are not depraved recidivists, but rather the sexually
uninitiated who eventually evolve, 134 shedding light on why freshman
year is the “red-zone.” 135
In any case, the idea is that law and policy should shift behavioral
practices toward an edified sexual consent script, involving open
negotiation, overt agreement, and double-checking frequently during
the sexual encounter. 136 Of course, “sex radical” commentators of both
genders might regard this as quite a dystopian sexual world, and
instinctively recoil at the notion that the government can use its carceral

SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/221153.pdf [hereinafter CSA STUDY] (one-in-five study).
132 Kirsten Gillibrand, We Will Not Allow These Crimes to Be Swept Under the Rug Any
Longer, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/100144/kirsten-gillibrand-campus-sexualassault; see also Amanda Marcotte, Rape Victims Are Common. Rapists Are Not, SLATE (May 1,
2014, 11:58 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/05/01/campus_sexual_assault_
statistics_so_many_victims_but_not_as_many_predators.html.
133 Most of these claims invoke a 2002 study. David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and
Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73 (2002). That study
has been heavily criticized, if not totally “debunked.” See Kevin M. Swartout et al., Trajectory
Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 12 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148 (2015) (discussing
problematic aspects of the Lisak study); see also Lizzie Crocker, Is Sex Assault Coverage Really
Sexist?, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 18, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/
18/is-sex-assault-coverage-really-sexist.html.
134 See Swartout et al., supra note 133.
135 See As Freshmen Enter ‘Red Zone,’ Colleges Re-Think Sexual Assault Policies, USA TODAY
C. (Sept. 7, 2014, 9:36 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2014/09/07/a-freshmen-enter-redzone-colleges-re-think-sexual-assault-policies; Peter Jacobs, The ‘Red Zone’ Is A Shockingly
Dangerous Time For Female College Freshmen, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/red-zone-shockingly-dangerous-female-college-freshmen-2014-7.
The CSA STUDY, supra note 131, and AAU Study, supra note 44, also support this idea.
136 See Anderson, supra note 92; supra Sections II.D, II.E.
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powers to violently stamp out sexual ambiguity. 137 Nonetheless, many
rightly regard the traditional sex script not as deliciously ambiguous, but
troublingly gendered and harmful to women. 138 Indeed, reading the
sociological literature on sex negotiation leaves one more unsettled than
reassured. 139 Yet even those with a robust skepticism of current sexual
culture (or even sex’s inherent value) are not likely to view as utopian a
world of written sex contracts. 140 On the other hand, less reformist
proposals, like the MPC’s contextual consent, hardly please those who
seek to “upend” traditional sex scripts. 141 Perhaps there is an
overlapping consensus on how ideal sexual consent should be
performed, involving something like stop and ask or clear agreement.
Critics often concede the wisdom of affirmative consent and agree
that best sexual practices involve clear communication. 142 Most
thoughtful commentators rightly hope that sexual communication,
sexual practices, and the repercussions of sex will change over time,
such that harmful sex is reduced and the costs and benefits of sex are
distributed more equally between men and women. The debate,
however, is about whether criminal law (or even college discipline) is an
appropriate tool of this cultural transformation. 143 The more restrictive
137 See, e.g., Franke, supra note 73, at 206–07 (“[T]o evacuate women’s sexuality of any risk
of a confrontation with shame, loss of control, or objectification strikes me as selling women a
sanitized, meager simulacrum of sex not worth getting riled up about in any case.”); see also
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 272 (“A world without ambiguity in erotic
interaction might be a very dull place . . . .”). See generally Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 89 (2014). For a fascinating history illuminating the connection between
feminist views of sexual violence and Republican politics, see Carole S. Vance, More Danger,
More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289,
290 (1993).
138 See Franke, supra note 73, at 208; Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 14, at 635 & n.297
(observing that affirmative consent envisions male sex proponents and fits in with existing
gender expectations).
139 See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the nonverbal and highly
gendered nature of consent negotiation).
140 Highly sex-restrictive aspirational visions, like the written contract, garner public
ridicule. See Section II.A; see, e.g., thedavechannel, Sexual Consent Video, YOUTUBE (Oct. 13,
2007) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLhH1axWiTI. The video―created by and for men,
it seems―means to ridicule the standard by portraying an in-bedroom negotiation with
counsel. Id. But it actually seems like a pretty cool sex script (minus the legal fees).
Interestingly, the woman negotiates both for progressive things (ten minutes of cunnilingus)
and retrogressive things (meeting parents), illustrating the complexity of how women navigate
gender roles, intimacy, and desire in sexual negotiation. Id.
141 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92, at 1411–21 (critiquing broad affirmative consent
standards).
142 See, e.g., Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes’, TIME (Aug. 29,
2014), http://time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes (stating that
“no one could oppose” affirmative consent’s goals of enthusiasm and mutual desire in sexual
encounters).
143 See Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html?r=0.
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the affirmative consent law, the greater the population subject to
incarceration in the quest for cultural transformation. Certain
affirmative consent proponents are candid that ordinary sexual actors
will be sacrificial lambs in the larger cultural effort. 144 Klein, for
instance, opines: “The Yes Means Yes laws creates an equilibrium where
too much counts as sexual assault. Bad as it is, that’s a necessary change.
A culture where one-in-five women is assaulted isn’t going to be
dislodged with a gentle nudge.” 145
One should, however, be wary of the “punitive impulse” to
embrace criminalization as a preferred tool of social change. 146 Experts
note that because society reacts poorly to the widespread criminalization
of ordinary behavior, laws that “shove” through change by radical
behavioral prescriptions are less effective than laws that “nudge” a
culture already at a tipping point. 147 In fact, shoves may produce
backlash and further entrench disfavored social practices.
Correspondingly, one might put more stock in the broader affirmative
consent standards than the narrow contract-type rules. Indeed, sexual
communicative norms, especially among young people in their
formative sexual years, are deeply psychological and socially
entrenched. 148 Such norms are likely to be “sticky” and resistant to
change, even in the face of the prosecution of a selection of those who
abide by the norms. 149
Indeed, experience shows that decision-makers will use discretion
to temper the power conferred by broad criminal laws―a phenomenon
we will return to in the distributional Section below. It bears mentioning
at this point that such discretion may undercut the cultural evolutionary
potential of affirmative consent laws. Our expansive criminal codes
already outlaw many acts routinely performed by ordinary people (i.e.,
loitering and trespass). In mediating broad penal power, police and
prosecutors tend to apply their authority in certain geographic areas and
to certain people. 150 In turn, the majority of citizens remain blissfully
144 See Klein, supra note 13; Little, supra note 104, at 1356; Schulhofer, Consent, supra note
12, at 679 (“[U]sing criminal law to discredit harmful social norms can be fair and effective.”).
145 Klein, supra note 13.
146 See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your
Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961 (2014).
147 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1805 (1992).
148 See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
149 See Kahan, supra note 147. In addition, the more artificial the script, the less likely it is
that there will be widespread enforcement by officials. Id.
150 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999).
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unaffected by the massive criminal regulatory regime because the
negative effects of broad prosecutorial authority fall on a marginalized
segment of society. 151 If strict affirmative consent laws follow this
familiar pattern, we might expect such sex regulation to apply in the
manner criminal regulation typically applies―to the “usual suspects.”
In turn, the rest of society will have little incentive to break from deeply
embedded, psychologically entrenched sexual communicative
practices. 152
In addition to the deterrence argument that affirmative consent
laws will not change behavior, critics lodge the retributive objection that
criminal law should not punish “innocents”―those who act within the
current norm―in the quest to secure a culture of utopian, riskregulated, sexual communication. 153 It is now prosaic for critics to claim
that criminal law is “a blunt tool.” Indeed, publicity about mass
incarceration and racialized policing has raised awareness of the
extensive costs―human, social, and economic―of criminal regulation
in particular. In response, defenders of affirmative consent set forth
retributive and distributional arguments. The retributive argument
denies that innocents are, in fact, sacrificed by the standard because
those who have sex without affirmative consent are simply not innocent.
The distributional argument, in direct contrast, does not deny that strict
affirmative consent rules are facially overbroad but holds that, in
practice, the rules will produce the right balance between convicting bad
actors and preserving ordinary sexual practice.
C.

The Retributive Argument: Affirmative Consent Is Morally
Required

The retributive argument is that people who fail to get positive
permission for sex are morally culpable and should be subject to
151 See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2012 (2008); Loïc
Wacquant, Race as Civic Felony, 57 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 127, 128 (2005). As for all violent crimes,
the proportion of blacks arrested for sexual offenses far exceeds the proportion of blacks in
society. See Crime in the United States 2012, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
152 Even if not discriminatorily applied, affirmative consent is unlikely to change norms. See
Johnson & Hoover, supra note 126 (discussing studies indicating that directives on consent are
ineffective because people interpret the term “consent” variably); Humphreys, supra note 123
(noting that a decade of affirmative consent in Canadian criminal law has not changed the
entrenched sexual script).
153 See Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in
the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 206 (1997); Douglas N. Husak &
George C. Thomas III, Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and Reasonable Mistake, 11 PHIL. ISSUES
86, 107 (2001).
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punishment. When retributive concerns over just deserts are ascendant,
other considerations like deterrence and mass incarceration fall by the
wayside. The axiom that the guilty deserve punishment is rarely denied.
The Supreme Court has held, for example, that even if the death penalty
does not deter murders, states may decide that it is retributively
warranted. 154 Retribution is indeed an expansive theory that critics
charge with enabling the hyper-punitive turn in American criminal
law. 155 Unreflectively invoking desert, they contend, can justify
punishing anyone for anything. Proponents of affirmative consent
advance two retributive claims about the standard’s fairness: First, it is
fair to criminalize sex without affirmative consent so long as people
have notice of the prohibition. 156 Second, criminalization is warranted
because sex without affirmative consent is morally wrongful behavior. 157
Affirmative consent proponents sometimes profess surprise that the
standard provokes so much consternation, given how “easy” it is to
comply with. 158 The idea is that law and policy can tell young people to
get a “yes,” and they will just do it. 159 Nevertheless, the social science
discussed above casts doubt on the ease of breaking with entrenched
sexual practices and complying with aspirational norms. Indeed, open
sexual communication comes at an emotional and psychological cost,
and not just for women. Studies show that people of both
sexes―especially young people―have strong incentive to eschew direct
expression of sexual desire to avoid awkwardness and embarrassment
and “save face” in the event of rejection. 160 In addition, one might
wonder why harsh criminal sanctions are necessary to compel people to
do that which, according to proponents, is already easy to do. In any
case, the notice given by various affirmative consent laws and policies is
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV.
811, 812 (2002).
156 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 266 (stating that once the law
announced the standard “it will be perfectly fair to punish anyone who disregards that
standard”); Gill, supra note 35, at 62.
157 See, e.g., Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 238–39 (1989)
(stating that a “communicative approach” to sex is “morally required”).
158 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 671–72; Rebekah Kuschmider, Ask a
Feminist: Affirmative Consent. What Is It?, HUFF. POST: IMPACT (Oct. 29, 2015, 3:18 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ravishly/ask-a-feminist-affirmative-consent-what-isit_b_8153606.html (“[Affirmative consent] can be easy, sexy, not awkward.”).
159 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92, at 1433–34 (noting that extensive education will
precede the rule); Gill, supra note 35, at 62 (asserting that affirmative consent might “decrease
the risk of convicting innocent men by placing them on notice”); Schulhofer, Consent, supra
note 12, at 671–72; Kuschmider, supra note 158 (“[affirmative consent] can be easy, sexy, not
awkward.”).
160 Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 422 (citing studies).
154
155
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far from clear (hence, the need to categorize them), leaving many to
wonder exactly what compliance entails. 161
Imagine, however, a law that clearly stated sex without a “verbal
‘yes’” is a crime. 162 For many theorists, there would remain the pressing
question of whether the government should have the ability to declare
such thing a crime. Indeed, one might set forth a constitutional
argument under Lawrence v. Texas that punishing sex-without-a-yes
constitutes regulation that infringes on people’s liberty to
“control . . . their private sexual conduct.” 163 In other words, in the quest
to eliminate unwanted sex, strict affirmative consent standards
criminalize a significant amount of wanted, consensual sex. Such sexualliberty restricting regulation is not necessarily saved by “a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults.” 164 Affirmative
consent advocates would probably respond that Lawrence declares a
liberty interest only in consensual and harmless sex, and sex-without-ayes is unconsensual and harmful. 165 Nevertheless, the more the
affirmative consent standard strays from accepted behavioral practices
(i.e., requiring a contract), the harder it is to maintain that those who
violate it are invariably immoral and harmful actors. 166
Penal theorists, such as Professor Kim Ferzan, argue that the crux
of wrongful sex is internal unwillingness, and defendants are culpable
only when they intend a wrongful act (to impose unwanted sex). 167
While philosophers might vary on the precise mens rea required for
culpability, most would agree that defendants who reasonably believe
that sex is wanted are not culpable, regardless of whether they stopped,

See supra Part II.
While no law says this, certain university policies do. See supra notes 74–75 and
accompanying text.
163 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
164 Id. at 559. Interestingly, the Lawrence opinion recognizes that one of the functions of
anti-sodomy law was to punish “predatory acts against those who could not or did not
consent.” Id. at 569. This would imply that a law infringing on sexual liberty is not necessarily
rendered constitutional because it is enforced only in cases of clear harm. This balance of
punishing the innocent and the government’s regulatory aim is typical of substantive due
process cases. See Foster v. State, 286 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1973) (holding that substantive due
process prevented state from punishing the possession of a screwdriver as a burglary tool
without proof that the screwdriver was used in a burglary). One possibility is that a yes-meansyes standard might be constitutional, but only if applied to a case where there was also proof of
actual nonconsent.
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting the argument that having sex without
express permission is a harm, regardless of whether the victim internally assented).
166 Schulhofer, for example, endorses a form of no-means-no standard, but asserts that the
contract formula is “preposterous” and the argument for verbal consent is unpersuasive.
Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 667.
167 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 397 (2016) [hereinafter Ferzan, Consent].
161
162
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asked, and received a “yes.” 168 For the law to hold otherwise, they assert,
is to criminally punish the non-culpable in an effort to satisfy some
other regulatory aim, which is morally repugnant. 169 While retributivist
declarations about what is and is not culpable conduct can seem
arbitrary, 170 the particular concern that very strict affirmative consent
laws punish innocents feels intuitively correct. Most people would scoff
at the idea that two people who engage in mutually desired,
communicative sex are both immoral actors because neither procured a
contract or a verbal “yes.” 171
This retributivist concern leads some critics to argue that
affirmative consent impermissibly makes rape a “strict liability”
offense. 172 In fact, affirmative consent laws and policies do not eliminate
mens rea, but rather attach intent to the required external
manifestations, instead of the complainant’s mental state. 173 Thus, under
a yes-means-yes standard, if “yes” is absent, defendants cannot argue
that they reasonably believed the complainant wanted sex, and this does
dispense with intent on internal willingness. However, the yes-meansyes law is not formally a strict liability law so long as it requires the
defendant to know (or have some intent) that the complainant did not
say “yes.” Thus, reformers are correct to say that affirmative consent
laws contain mens rea. This, however, does not explain why such mens
rea establishes criminal culpability. 174 A legislature might, for example,
prohibit “sex during college” in an effort to curb unwanted sex and
specify that the prosecution must prove 175 that the defendant
See id. at 416; Husak & Thomas, supra note 153, at 107–08; supra Section I.C.
See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply to Ayres and Baker, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 641 (2006) (critiquing proposed crime of first-time sex without a
condom for being “overinclusive” and “punishing the morally innocent”).
170 See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2002).
171 Feminist commentators often assume the criminal prohibition against uncommunicative
sex will be applied only to men. See, e.g., Pineau, supra note 157, at 239–40 (advocating
criminalizing “a man [who] does not engage in communicative sexuality” to entrench a “norm
of sex to which a reasonable woman would agree”).
172 See, e.g., Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 279, 325 (2010) (equating affirmative consent with “guilty until proven innocent”).
173 See, e.g., MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 52 (establishing a recklessness mens rea for lack
of affirmative consent).
174 Ferzan argues that such affirmative consent standards are not formal strict liability, but
that they are substantive strict liability because the standard does not attach to wrongful
conduct. Ferzan, Consent, supra note 167, at 418 (citing Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict
Criminal Liability Just, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1087 (1997)).
175 Critics of affirmative consent mistakenly argue that affirmative consent is burden
shifting. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 68. It is not. Instead of having to prove
unconsensual sex, the prosecution can prove something much easier, such as sex without a
“yes.” Cf. Susan Dwyer, What a Difference ‘Yes’ Makes for Sex, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 6, 2015,
168
169
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“knowingly” engaged in that behavior. Most would concede that having
sex during college is not wrongful and those who do it knowingly are
not criminally culpable. 176 For many critics, narrow affirmative consent
standards represent a similar overreach, even if they contain robust
intent requirements.
Nevertheless, some activists declare that it is morally wrong for
men to fail to obtain affirmative consent because they participate in
chauvinist culture. 177 However, the same might be said of women who
are sexually passive and engage in token resistance. We would think it
outrageous to jail women for engaging in this “rape-permissive”
behavior. 178 One might claim that the difference is that men who do not
obtain a “yes” impose unwanted sex on their victims, whereas women
who perform token resistance do not harm anyone, except perhaps
women in general. Yet this is only true if the lack of a “yes” is
coextensive with internal unwillingness, which it is not. 179 Thus, if men
who do not get a “yes” are culpable for maintaining bad sexual culture
when they could “easily” do otherwise, women are similarly culpable for
engaging in token resistance when they could “easily” say what they
want. 180
More persuasive is the argument that sex without affirmative
consent, although not immoral in itself, is culpably risky (of producing
unwanted sex). In this view, such sex is like speeding or drunk driving:
law can regulate the risky behavior itself and hold defendants
responsible when the behavior produces harm, even relatively
unforeseeable harm. 181 As an initial matter, it is a bit surreal to hear
liberal criminal law theorists tout reduction of risk―unquantified

2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/campus-sexualassaultaffirmativeconsent.html (applauding affirmative consent for “shift[ing] the burden”).
176 And it would likely be subject to constitutional challenge. See supra notes 163–64 and
accompanying text (discussing Lawrence's prohibition of criminalizing consensual sex).
177 See, e.g., Pineau, supra note 157.
178 But see Little, supra note 104, at 1348 (advocating affirmative consent as a “model of
sexual interaction where both participants take responsibilities for their desires and actions”).
179 See, e.g., supra Section I.B.
180 Indeed, culture changing programs target men and women. See Tovia Smith, Colleges
Straddle Line Between Assault Prevention and Victim-Blaming, NPR (Nov. 21, 2014, 4:17 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/11/21/365460145/colleges-straddle-line-between-assault-preventionand-victim-blaming. Radical feminists might simply grant women immunity for participating
in sexist culture, considering such participation a product of male domination, but rape
reformers rarely openly articulate such a “female supremacist” view. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 72 (2006).
181 See MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 70 (comparing no means no to drunk driving laws).
We might question whether criminal risk regulation is warranted in the driving context.
Theorists struggle with, for example, DUI manslaughter laws or whether negligence per se
should apply in vehicular homicide cases.

GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete)

12/14/2016 12:58 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

452

[Vol. 38:415

risk―as a basis for criminal liability. 182 Moreover, the dangerous
sex/dangerous driving analogy creates more questions than answers
about affirmative consent. Any sex risks unwanted sex, just as any
driving risks an accident, and the question is when risk warrants
regulation. Is sex-without-a-yes like driving fifty or ninety miles per
hour? Is failing to stop-and-ask like driving with a .04 or a .09 blood
alcohol level? Who gets to draw the line? Risky sex is no longer a matter
of the defendant’s (or even reasonable person’s) awareness of a
probability that the complainant is unwilling, but rather a matter of
violating a bright line based on some independent risk calculation.
Culpability is accordingly a function of distribution. This rule-like
negligence dictates that people deserve punishment, not when they are
subjectively reckless or even socially unreasonable, but when they
transgress a regulatory rule based on some external balance of sex risks
and rewards. 183 This calculation is inevitably a function of one’s beliefs
as to how risky sex without affirmative consent is and the value of the
sex that is repressed. 184
D.

The Distributional Argument: Affirmative Consent Produces
Distributive Justice

The final set of arguments in favor of affirmative consent are not
formalist like retributivist arguments, but are legal realist in nature: they
defend the standard by asserting that the law “in action” does not
criminalize ordinary sex; rather, it pushes back on the underprosecution of clearly unacceptable sex. As an initial matter, it is
certainly worthwhile to try to trace or predict the winners and losers of
any given legal regime or recommended reform. Indeed, I and others
have touted “distributional analysis” as a preferred method of engaging
182 Perhaps the prominence of the risk reduction argument is a function of recent publichealthizing of the sexual assault discussion by federal bureaucrats and college administrators.
But given that age, drunkenness, and other factors are as (or perhaps more) predictive of
unwanted sex than the utterance of “yes,” public health programs target a range of behaviors
and include things like abstinence, gender segregation, and party prevention. See Gersen & Suk,
supra note 43, at 912–16 (discussing such public health initiatives).
183 See Kelman, supra note 54, at 610.
184 Regulations are often based on some calculus of the likelihood that the activity
(manufacturing, securities trading, labor practices, etc.) performed at a certain “level” will cause
harm versus how reducing that “level” might affect the activity’s beneficial effects. See Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
1661, 1667–71 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). Does sex without “affirmative
consent” significantly increase the risk of unwanted sex? If it does, who gets to decide the value
of the foregone sex?
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in progressive legal lawmaking. 185 Too often, reformers simply assume
that their proposals will operate in the manner they envision in their
minds. Advocates can be so wedded to these visions that they argue for
their programs by contrasting the status quo with what is ideal rather
than what is possible. 186 Consequently, the impetus of rape reformers to
determine what consent laws are out there, how they are being used, and
who they are being used for and against, is a very positive development
in rape theorizing. 187
Having said that, it bears noting that most proponents’ law-on-theground analyses are less about showing that the affirmative consent
standard produces good results than about defending it against critics’
gloom-and-doom predictions that the standard will widely punish
ordinary sexual actors. 188 As a result, those making distributional
arguments have already determined that affirmative consent is
warranted―probably for reasons cited above―and set out to show that
it will not lead to jailing people who have sex without getting the magic
words.
Affirmative consent critics decry the risk that a willing sexual
partner will report rape, for whatever reason, and unless there was a
“yes,” the accused is guilty. 189 Advocates respond that this vision of a
world full of vindictive or unreasonable complainants utilizing broad
affirmative consent standards to punish ordinary sexual actors is
nothing more than men’s persistent “nightmare.”190 Reformers rightly
assert that fears of vengeful women lying about rape are greatly
exaggerated. 191 However, advocates go further and argue that critics’
185 See Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal
Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211 (2015) [hereinafter Gruber, Theory]; Janet Halley et
al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 335, 405 (2006) (describing “distributively focused legal analysis”).
186 See Gruber, Theory, supra note 185, at 3229–30; Halley et al., supra note 185, at 336.
187 See, e.g., Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 979 (2008) (considering how a
specialized “sex crimes” court might distribute costs and benefits across different classes);
Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25.
188 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at 446–47.
189 See Dwyer, supra note 175 (describing this view); see also Marnie Eisenstadt, ‘Yes Means
Yes’ will Lead to False Claims of Sexual Assault, Male Student Advocate Says, SYRACUSE.COM
(July 15, 2015, 1:03 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/state/index.ssf/2015/07/yes_means_yes_
will_lead_to_false_claims_of_sexual_assault_male_student_advocate.html;
Scott
Greer,
Opinion, Campus Rape Hysteria Has No Use for Due Process, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 14, 2015,
1:27
AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/14/campus-rape-hysteria-has-no-use-for-dueprocess/#ixzz40RwvaDYD.
190 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Little, supra note 104, at 1357
(describing the “[b]ogeyman of the [f]alse [a]ccusation”).
191 See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 14, at 597–98, 598 n.84 (discussing competing
statistics); see also Dwyer, supra note 175 (calling this a “morally repulsive assumption”).
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fears are misplaced because affirmative consent standards will not lead
victims to file reports in ambiguous, fraught, or contestable consent
cases, and if they do, police, prosecutors, and college investigators will
not pursue them. 192
This argument is somewhat strange, given that it rationalizes
affirmative consent laws on the ground that they will not be followed.
And it seems to conflict with the justification that the reform increases
reporting and controls recalcitrant police and prosecutors. Accordingly,
the pro-affirmative consent distributional argument must say something
more like this: the standard will increase the right kind of reporting and
prosecutions. In the status quo (non-affirmative consent world), the
argument goes, women fail to report even forcible and clearly
unconsensual rapes because of embarrassment, fear, traumatization, or
other structural barriers. Police and prosecutors decline to pursue all
types of rape cases because of prejudice or concern over obtaining a
conviction in a he said, she said situation. Juries acquit because of error
or prejudice. 193 Affirmative consent standards will encourage these
victims to report, these police and prosecutors to pursue cases, and these
juries to convict. The net result is more frequent prosecution and
conviction in clearly harmful, but not contestable, cases.
Will affirmative consent work out this way? We simply do not
have—and probably will never get—empirical evidence on how
affirmative consent affects reporting in uncontroversial versus
contestable rape cases. It is worth noting, however, that forcible
intercourse and clearly unconsensual sex are already fully criminalized
without affirmative consent. Victims fail to report such rapes because of
structural barriers, not lack of criminalization, and they would face such
barriers regardless of an affirmative consent law. 194 An affirmative
consent law is therefore likely to affect a different class of potential
reporters: those who experience more ambiguous sexual assaults, like
cases involving “miscommunication,” 195 and think they are not crimes.
Indeed, studies reveal that victims often do not report such assaults
because they do not see them as “rapes” or regard them as serious
enough to report. Affirmative consent laws may have the effect of
192 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25 (asserting that fears about
“miscommunication” cases are overblown).
193 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
194 As it is, the existence of “stereotypical” rape attributes like physical force and injury are
the best predictors of when a rape will be reported. See Ronet Bachman, The Factors Related to
Rape Reporting Behavior and Arrest: New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization
Survey, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 20, 22 tbl.2 (1998).
195 See Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part I (describing an array of
concerns over miscommunication).
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persuading such victims and/or the people they consult with that sex
without affirmative consent is serious enough to report. The
conversation might go something like this:
A: “I’m not sure I should report this. We were both pretty drunk,
and I didn’t say to stop. But I just don’t feel right.”
A’s Best Friend: “B did not stop and ask your permission. You did
not say yes. That is rape, and you should report it.”
Encouragement increases reporting, so let us assume A decides to
report. 196 This is obviously a great result for affirmative consent
proponents who want to increase reporting in cases of ambiguous
consent. 197 However, it runs directly counter to the contention that
affirmative consent will not increase the prosecution of
miscommunication cases. Indeed, affirmative consent is linked to
reporting because it signals to victims that they will be believed, will not
be “put on trial,” and will obtain a favorable outcome. However, this
incentive structure applies with equal force to victims in clear and
ambiguous cases alike. 198
Some suggest that prosecutors will use their discretion to weed out
fraught reports. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer, for example,
canvassed published appellate decisions in “affirmative consent
jurisdictions” 199 and found that the term affirmative consent cropped
up, not in miscommunication or contested consent situations, but in
incidents involving force, intoxication, and unconsciousness. 200 The
cases went like this: The prosecution argued that the victim was
asleep/incapacitated/deathly afraid. The defendant argued that the
victim was not and, in fact, consented. The court upheld the conviction
because
the
jury
could
find
that
the
victim
was
196 See Lisa A. Paul et al., Does Encouragement by Others Increase Rape Reporting? Findings
from a National Sample of Women, 38 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 222 (2013). But see Bryden,
Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 422 (postulating that affirmative consent would not greatly
increase reporting in general because of social norms).
197 Of course, there is reason to wonder whether feminist reformers would want this if we
imagine A as a male and B as a female. See supra note 37.
198 Cf. Ashe Schow, Student Newspaper Just Fine with False Accusations, WASH. EXAMINER
(Oct. 22, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/student-newspaper-just-finewith-false-accusations/article/2574703 (discussing student newspaper’s claim that false
accusation is a justified cost of increased reporting).
199 Tuerkheimer included all jurisdictions whose rape statutes plausibly required
performative consent. Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part III.
200 See David P. Bryden, Reason and Guesswork in the Definition of Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 585, 591 (2000) [hereinafter Bryden, Reason and Guesswork] (noting the “danger” that
affirmative consent will lower the burden of proof in more serious cases).
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asleep/incapacitated/deathly afraid and, therefore, did not "affirmatively
consent." 201 Tuerkheimer’s study, thus, indicates that affirmative
consent exerts little influence on miscommunication cases and rape
prosecution in general. The author reasons that this lack of influence
may be due to prosecutors’ refusal to bring “gray zone” cases. 202
It may be that prosecutors in affirmative consent jurisdictions do
not pursue difficult miscommunication cases. One must, however,
exercise caution in drawing conclusions from the sparse evidence in
published appellate decisions. In affirmative consent jurisdictions, the
few appeals all involve “traditional” rape scenarios, but this may just
mean that the miscommunication cases pled out or were not appealed.
The appellate case analysis simply does not speak to the types of rapes
prosecuted but not appealed and why prosecutors pursed them. That
said, if it is true that prosecutors weed out the “gray” cases affirmative
consent law could address, one is left to wonder exactly what the reform
does. The law’s aim is evidently to encourage prosecutors to pursue
cases they otherwise might not―cases provable under affirmative
consent but not weaker rape laws. 203 However, one can only speculate
on whether this happens.
So let me engage in some brief speculation. Assume that a
jurisdiction makes it a low level felony to have sex without stopping and
asking permission. What will happen with this newfound prosecutorial
power? One possibility is that it will operate how prosecutorial power
often does―compelling defendants in close cases to forego trial and
plead guilty. Thus, if evidence of force, coercion, or intoxication is weak,
the prosecution will threaten the affirmative consent law to induce a
plea. 204 Whether this is good or bad depends on whether one thinks that
prosecutors are currently too stingy with force, coercion, and
intoxication prosecutions and whether the evidentiary threshold in such
cases is too high. 205 In diametric opposition to this scenario, some
Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part II.
Id. at 467.
203 See Diehl, supra note 113, at 507 (asserting that prosecutors have a duty to strictly
enforce affirmative consent to educate an “unaware” society about the “distinction between
rape, consent, and acceptable sexual behavior”).
204 Prosecutors can also take weak force or intoxication cases to trial, with lack of affirmative
consent as a fall back.
205 Compare Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at 447 n.27 (prosecutors
bringing more cases would be “a positive feature of affirmative consent, particularly given that
rape law is significantly underenforced”), and Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670–71
(asserting that performative consent is necessary to address intoxication and subtle coercion),
with Bryden, Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 408 (“To use an affirmative-consent law mainly
to solve proof problems, when the prosecutor believes, but perhaps cannot prove, that the
defendant is guilty of a more serious crime, would be troubling.” (footnote omitted)).
201
202
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hypothesize that focusing prosecutors and jurors on consent
performance will make them less likely to prosecute and convict in cases
of subtle coercion where victims appear to agree. 206
The second possibility is that prosecutors will use the new
authority to pursue a subset of miscommunication cases. Charges may
arise when the prosecutor instinctively views the defendant as a true
criminal (not a regular guy), when the prosecutor regards the victim as
“credible,” or when the victim is vehement. These discretionary
prosecutions might meaningfully overlap with the type of cases scholars
think should be brought, but they might not. Prosecutors’ views of true
criminality may be influenced more by racial and socioeconomic
characteristics than by the nature of the sexual event. 207 Similarly,
assessments of victims’ credibility may involve race, class, or gender
stereotyping. Moreover, the most vehement victims may also be the
most biased and unbelievable. 208 It is true that these are problems of
prosecutorial discretion in general, not just affirmative consent
prosecutions; however, rape reformers do not get a “free pass” to write
off the problems of the U.S. carceral system, especially when investing
state actors with broad discretionary power.
In the end, it is difficult to predict how the burdens and benefits of
affirmative consent rules will distribute. 209 Affirmative consent
proponents have faith that broad proposals will lead to increased
prosecution of “clear” (not miscommunication) cases and eventually
produce a yes-means-yes culture, without the cost of punishing those
who act within the norms of prevailing sexual culture. But “faith” is the
correct word here because there is no particular reason to believe that
this is how things will play out. In any case, the fact is that affirmative
consent laws say that lack-of-affirmative-consent cases are “clear” cases.
Consequently, while all thoughtful law reformers should endeavor to
206 See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1005
(1998) (noting the argument that focusing on the complainant’s consent can deflect from a
focus on the coercive means used by the defendant to procure sex).
207 See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 360 (2009); Jeffrey J. Pokorak,
Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1811, 1815, 1819–20 (1998) (both discussing race and prosecutorial discretion in capital
punishment); see also Bryden, Reason and Guesswork, supra note 200, at 591 (postulating that
affirmative consent might lead to discriminatory enforcement).
208 See Lynne Henderson, Commentary, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 584 (1998) (“‘Victims’ are ‘blameless,’ innocent,
usually attractive, middle class, and white.”).
209 See Richard Pérez-Peña & Ian Lovett, California Law on Sexual Consent Pleases Many but
Leaves Some Doubters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/us/
california-law-on-sex-consent-pleases-many-but-leaves-some-doubters.html?_r=1 (noting that
universities applying California’s law “are hampered by a lack of hard data about what works”
and thus “rely on instinct and anecdote”).
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determine if their reform does what it says, affirmative consent
proponents are in the strange position of speculating on the effects of
the rule, despite what it says. 210
CONCLUSION
My hope is that the reader now better understands what policy
makers and public intellectuals mean when they tout or reject
“affirmative consent” and the types of arguments and counterarguments
that follow. This understanding is critical at a moment when the debate
over rape law, on each side of the political fence, has a say-anything-forthe-sake-of-argument feel. This Article also sheds a skeptical light on
scholars’ relative consensus that consent is the best framework for rape
law. In other areas of rape law, policy makers lay out and debate the
specific types of circumstances that render sex criminal: age
combinations, types of extortion, nature of promises, fiduciary
relationships, categories of force, etc. And then there is consent.
Consent ends up playing the role of a catchall, permitting rape
prosecutions in the areas where the law fails to articulate the specific
unacceptable conditions of sex. But its liberal construct has prevented
meaningful dialogue on the exact sexual interactions rape-consent laws
should catch. Reformers maintain that, left to its own devices, consent
did not catch enough criminal behavior. But rather than abandoning the
consent framework, they turned to affirmative consent, which
purported to build a better consent mousetrap and thereby vindicate
“sexual autonomy.” Situating affirmative consent reform as a mere
means to improving the liberal consent inquiry has obscured the very
motivations behind expanding the catch-all—the empirical and
normative beliefs about how sex happens, how it should happen, the
benefits and harms of sex, and the role of criminal law in regulating
sexuality. This Article brought those claims into the open, where they
should be, as a preface to a clear, communicative, and unambiguous
negotiation over the content of rape law. 211

210 But see Diehl, supra note 113, at 507 (urging prosecutors to use affirmative consent to
prosecute ambiguous cases).
211 Recently, I was speaking to a student about an affirmative consent paper topic. She said:
“I want to argue that affirmative consent is a straightforward standard from contract law that
simply requires agreement.” So I asked her what actions or communications would constitute
such agreement. Concerned, she replied: “If I were to get into that I’d have to talk about sex.”

